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Abstract—The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
into weapon systems is one of the most consequential tactical
and strategic decisions in the history of warfare. Current
AI development is a remarkable combination of accelerat-
ing capability, hidden decision mechanisms, and decreasing
costs. Implementation of these systems is in its infancy and
exists on a spectrum from resilient and flexible to simplistic
and brittle. Resilient systems should be able to effectively
handle the complexities of a high-dimensional battlespace.
Simplistic AI implementations could be manipulated by an
adversarial AI that identifies and exploits their weaknesses.
In this paper, we present a framework for understanding
the development of dynamic AI/ML systems that interac-
tively and continuously adapt to their user’s needs. We
explore the implications of increasingly capable AI in the
kill chain and how this will lead inevitably to a fully
automated, always on system, barring regulation by treaty.
We examine the potential of total integration of cyber and
physical security and how this likelihood must inform the
development of AI-enabled systems with respect to the “fog
of war”, human morals, and ethics.
Index Terms—machine learning, computer simulation,
human-computer interaction
I. INTRODUCTION
John Boyd’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
(OODA) model formalizes the description of the inputs,
outputs, experiences, and biases that explain tactical
decision-making for individuals and groups. In this
model, an adversary attacking either (O)bservation or
(O)rientation can create the conditions for incorrect or
catastrophic (D)ecisions and (A)ctions. Even without ex-
acerbating conditions such as combat, humans often find
decision-making under stress difficult, particularly with
incomplete information. The natural human tendency
to defer to authorities for decision-making, human or
machine, can also lead to disastrous outcomes [1], [2].
Artificial intelligence and machine learning promise to
integrate dynamically into the human decision-making
processes in ways previous technologies could not, in-
cluding by being responsive to the operator’s cognitive
load. In the simplest approach, machines perform only
tedious and boring tasks. In a slightly more complex
scenario, machines perform as much of the non-decision-
making activity as possible so that humans can focus
completely on the task at hand. In the most complex
scenario, humans are not directly involved with the
system as it performs the task independently. These
“always on” systems respond to threats that are beyond
the capability of real-time human supervision. Human
interaction is restricted to activities such as training the
system in offline or simulated environments
Many countries are currently pursuing an ambitious
AI agenda, including the United States and several
potential adversaries [3], [4]. Secretive development of
lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) leads to
the conditions for an AI arms race. Tactically, each side’s
human/AI system would be attempting to “turn inside”
the adversaries’ OODA loop. Although AI may be an
advantage in cognitive offloading of mundane tasks
or through increased speed and capability in battle, it
presents an opportunity for a new class of attacks that
take advantage of the latent, high-dimensional spaces
in deep neural networks. These unobserved regions of
the AI decision-making process are prone to normal
accidents – a type of “inevitable” accident that emerges
in situations where components are densely connected,
tightly coupled, and opaque in their processing [5]. Study
of this field began with accidents such as Three-Mile
Island, but AI technologies embody similar risks. Finding
and exploiting these weaknesses to induce defective
behavior will become a permanent feature of military
strategy [6].
This human/AI partnership is likely to produce emer-
gent behaviors that are not obvious extensions of current
military thinking. This creates a tension between two
poles. At one end is the need for systems to be trust-
worthy. They should predictably do what we believe is
the right thing in ethically difficult conditions. At the
other end is the need to be responsive and dynamic in
unpredictable conditions. In this paper, we develop a
framework for examining problems in this nascent area
of intelligent warfighting machines.
II. BACKGROUND
Although the battlespace becomes faster and more
complex as information communications technologies
improves, the fundamental tactics have been unchanged
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for centuries: opposing commanders observe the evolv-
ing battlespace, attempt to understand and model the
space, and act to produce positive outcomes. Of course,
what makes this difficult is that the adversary is doing
the same thing, leading to a co-evolving physical and
information environment that is difficult to predict with
any certainty [7].
These rapidly co-evolving battlespace dynamics are
one of the largest obstacles in involving current state-of-
the-art machine learning systems. Currently, the best AI
is based on enormous networks that are trained for days
against massive datasets. The time frames involved in
this process do not afford the rapid updates that human
interaction requires.
To address both the promise and the risks of adding
lethal combat capabilities to AI systems, we need to
establish a development framework that emphasizes
human control over the behaviors of such systems,
regardless of how sophisticated they become. At the core,
we believe that these aspects of human control must
include the following:
Interactivity: Users need to be able to explore and adjust
the behavior of the system to confirm changes that they
made and validate that the system exhibits a more
“correct” behavior.
Transparency: Although intelligent machines may never
truly be able to explain their actions, they should be
able to reveal the sources from which they learned any
particular behavior.
Resiliency: Intelligent systems cannot be brittle. They
must handle overload conditions gracefully and recover
quickly. They must be able to indicate when they are
operating with low confidence, and they cannot simply
freeze.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
The goal of adding AI to the battlespace is to augment
humans decision-making, but, adding AI to this decision-
making process would have ramifications that need to be
considered carefully. If AI systems are effective, pressure
to increase the level of assistance to the warfighter would
be inevitable. Continued success would mean gradually
pushing the human out of the loop, first to a supervisory
role and then finally to the role of a “killswitch operator”
monitoring an always-on LAWS [8].
We see four relevant areas of work that address aspects
of this problem space:
Cybersecurity: the virtual counterpart to the physical
weapons systems
Hand-to-hand combat: a proxy for thinking about multi-
ple adversarial AI systems of equal capability engaged
in combat
Machine learning research: how current state-of-the art
AI systems can responsively and interactively update
their states
Military strategy: how these systems must operate in
the problem space
In Section III-A, we examine the current state of the art
in cyberdefense, the limits of a defense-only strategy,
and the emerging argument for cyber-counterattacks,
including concerns about automation. Using that as a
technological frame, we discuss hand-to-hand combat as a
proxy for what happens when there are roughly matched
adversarial intelligent systems engaged in extremely
dynamic kinetic actions in Section III-B. We then examine
how machine learning research addresses the need for
interactive, evolving dynamic adaptation in Section III-C.
Finally, we fit this information in the frame of military
strategy in Section III-D, focusing on the interaction of
practical combat considerations and international law,
particularly article 51 of the UN charter.
A. Cybersecurity and the limits of defense
Cybersecurity controls and countermeasures often
employ several machine learning and data mining tech-
niques to uncover signs of misuse, anomaly detection, or
hybrid approaches that do both [9]. One of the fundamen-
tal issues is the volume and velocity of the information
that can be associated with an attack. Machine learning
techniques aid network administrators seeking to respond
to actual issues rather than false alarms, but this approach
also represents a weakness. Zero day attacks, which have
no previously known signature, can only be detected
using anomaly detection systems. If successful, a zero day
attack may be able to exploit a system for considerable
periods of time. For example, the FBI has determined
that four individuals with Russian support were able
to penetrate the Yahoo network for two years, getting
subscriber information on 500 million accounts before
their activities were detected and stopped [10].
Adaptation or generalization from one attack vector to
multiple does not prevent this threat. The more adaptable
the classifier is, the more open it is to manipulation
adversarial training techniques. In other words, an
adversary can learn the latent spaces in the classifier
that lead to false results. This can be exploited to over-
whelm the system with false positives for benign vectors
while simultaneously rendering dangerous vectors less
detectable [11].
Academic computer security research is overwhelm-
ingly oriented towards detecting and blocking cyberat-
tacks. Regardless of whether the detection scheme is
recognition or anomaly-based, all these approaches rest
on the fundamental assumption that cybersecurity is
passive. Systems wait for attacks, identify them as fast as
possible, and determine the best course(s) of action and
respond, often within milliseconds [9].
There is a growing awareness among cybersecurity
professionals that there may be a need for active defense
as well, particularly if the cyberattack results in damage
to critical national infrastructure. Active defense may be
both appropriate and effective in eliciting cooperation.
Axelrod showed in 1981 that tit-for-tat responses to
aggression were a robust and effective response [12]. Two
considerations are crucial: The first is whether counter
attack makes sense as a strategy [13], [14]. The second
is how fast to respond. Current government processes
associated with responding to kinetic attacks are too slow
for responsive cyberattacks [15].
This highlights the fundamental issue in the use of
AI systems in weapons systems, whether virtual or
physical. The feedback loop between ever-increasing
technical capability and the political awareness of the
decreasing time window for reflective decision-making
drives technical evolution towards always-on, automated,
reflexive systems [8]. This pressure needs to be addressed
openly and transparently in any system design.
B. Hand-to-hand Combat
A useful analogy to the evolutionary path that we
see happening is individual unarmed combat. This is
the only example where we can observe a proxy of
similarly matched intelligent systems interacting using
the affordances of force [16]. This model is only effective
for considering evenly matched AI combat systems
because in a mismatch, the odds of a rout are high.
Asymmetric encounters are important as well but not the
focus of this model.
Most human combat consists of two phases: an assess-
ment phase where the adversaries evaluate each other
before striking. This phase is more analytical and less
reflexive. The adversaries evaluate one another in a highly
dynamic state while moving in tandem. They employ past
training to generate a plan of action while continuously
attempting to lead the opponent into making incorrect
assessments, increasing the size and complexity of the
problem space each opponent has to consider [17]. The
second phase is a kinetic phase involving rapid strike, de-
fense, and counterstrike. For these actions to be effective,
they have to be reflexive. Any reflective thinking slows
down the action, exposing vulnerability.
These two processes roughly correspond to Kahne-
man’s mechanisms for human cognition [18]. Kahneman’s
System 1 is reflexively responding to a stimulus, whereas
his System 2 is conscious calculation. System 1 can be
“trained” to respond with seemingly conscious calcula-
tion. A good fighter can produce complex sequences of
reflexive action in response to combat cues. For example,
The Book of Five Rings [16], a canonical work describing
traditional Japanese martial arts, describes the Crimson-
Leaves Strike, a trained reflexive action. The first part of
the strike is to identify or cause the opponent to lower
his guard. This triggers a trained reflex that causes the
fighter to strike reflexively at the opening.
We employ this combat model for the entire range of
human and AI combat systems, from fully human to
fully automated. In all cases, action in the kinetic phase
must be as fast as possible, leaving no time to search
for novel solutions. What changes in the transition to AI
systems will be the speed and number of dimensions
to consider. One can easily imagine human/computer
partnerships, where humans become more involved with
the assessment phase and less with the kinetic phase.
Over time, as AI becomes more capable of reflective and
integrative thinking, the human component will have to
be eliminated altogether as the speed and dimensionality
become incomprehensible, even accounting for cognitive
assistance.
C. Machine Learning
Modern machine learning research is focused on devel-
oping huge models that train over even larger datasets,
often for days and weeks. Though startlingly effective,
these systems struggle to adapt to changing conditions
[19]. One method to increase adaptability is called Transfer
Learning [20], which allows a model optimized and
trained on one dataset to be modified and trained on a
different, smaller but related dataset. For example, image
recognition systems trained to recognize vehicles for a
self-driving car application could be adapted to detect
and recognize military aircraft.
These kinds of machine learning models contain a
weakness. Numerous studies have shown that adversarial
attacks can cause systems to misclassify examples that
are only slightly different from correctly classified exam-
ples” [21]. For example, Figure 1 shows that wearing a
picture can fool an image classifier [22].
Figure 1. Adversarial Attack Against an Image Classifier [22]
For combat systems, huge models create an inherent
risk. Because academic and corporate models are few
and often in the public domain, a malicious actor seeking
to save development costs can simply download and
study them for areas where they can be manipulated
to respond incorrectly to a particular set of stimuli [21].
However, transfer learning changes only a small part
of the network, latent space vulnerabilities would likely
exist regardless of how the model has been adapted. This
places any combat system based on one of these models
at risk for undetectable exploitation. Models developed
in secure environments based on real and simulated data
may be significantly more secure from exploitation, but
with a correspondingly higher cost to develop.
Neural network systems can learn as they interact with
an environment, through Reinforcement Learning (RL) [23].
This techniques allows a system to explore a problem
space with respect to an evaluation function that can score
the system’s behavior. Such systems can learn to move in
simulated environments, play games, and operate robots.
Adversarial versions, where one RL system is scored
by how well it is competing against another, currently
form the basis for state of the art results in such games
as Chess and Alpha Go. Training time for adversarial
gamespaces is significant. DeepMind’s AlphaGo Zero
took approximately 40 days to train, including self-play
of 29 million games [24]. If a less exhaustive exploration
of the data space is acceptable, RL systems can be
guided through their learning process by humans. This
technique significantly reduces learning time because
humans can often recognize incorrect behavior long
before the machine can [25].
D. Military Strategy
The role of military systems varies by context and
can be deeply complicated. Broadly, forces can be in
a peacetime state, at the boundary between peace and
war, and in armed conflict [26]. Article 51 of the UN
Charter specifies that member states may always act in
self defense, but there are now decades of precedent that
specify how that right may be interpreted. Further, as
we have seen in the cyberdefense section, the definition
of what constitutes force is changing.
Understanding military contexts matters because of
how we develop trust in the automated systems we
use regularly. Continuous interaction builds trust in-
crementally until we implicitly hand off responsibility
to the system and direct our attention elsewhere [27],
[28]. This user bias is recognized as the root cause in
numerous accidents. If your early warning system alerts
for an incoming attack, the pressure to trust the alert and
respond is powerful. System trust has been a contributing
factor in fratricidal battlefield losses involving Patriot
Missiles in Iraq [29]. Once any level of handoff occurs,
the transfer of control should generally assumed to be
total.
When a soldier or commander makes a judgment call
about the use of force, an explicit set of procedures, orders,
or other judgment calls precede the first shot being fired.
This chain of accountability reduces the dimensionality
of the problem space of the decision. But intelligent
machines do not proceed similarly. Once a higher-level
decision is made, an AI weapon system can effect orders
almost immediately, which is part of the attraction of
integrating AI into conflict operations.
When we start to include AI in weapons systems at any
level, the system will need to know the context it is acting
in and the rules of engagement for that context. Designers
cannot foresee all potential contexts, so the system will
need to be adaptable and transparent. A human-intensive
example of this approach is used in the Aegis combat
system, where the parameters for semiautomated and
fully automated behavior of the system is prepared
in advance of each deployment by the ship’s doctrine
review board, a diverse mix of officers and senior enlisted
crew that review all aspects of the upcoming mission
before preparing a suite of behavior “packages” that can
activated by the captain [8].
Context is critical. Training exercises may look like
war, but they are actually between allies. A cold war may
look like peace, but it isn’t exactly. Any intelligent system
(human, human/machine, or machine) must be aware
of these and other complicating concerns. A weapons
system that either directly or indirectly starts a conflict
will need to act in accordance with international law
or risk implicating its makers and the government that
activated it in war crimes. Adversaries know this and will
try to use that weakness against any intelligent system.
The U.S. Military does not have and significant tech-
nological advantage in this space. China, to take one
example, views the U.S. as highly vulnerable in cyberwar
and is working to cement its potential advantage. Pres-
sure to develop systems that can effectively grapple with
our adversaries across multiple domains, dimensions, and
timeframes will be extremely high. All sides are equally
pressured to gain superiority, and as such the inevitability
of fully automated, always on systems should be seriously
considered in all aspects of AI integration.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Military adaptation of commercially or academically
trained models contains inherent risks. However, these
risks highlight potential opportunities for development
that are distinct from the focus of commercial and
academic communities. In particular, we identify the
following opportunities and challenges: (A) Offline latent
space hacking by adversaries; (B) Incorporating legal and
ethical constraints into training a model; (C) Mapping,
traceability, and transparency of inputs and outputs; and
(D) Avoiding dangerous predictability.
A. Offline Latent Space Hacking by Adversaries
Learning to exploit regions in the available latent space
of large models should be explored in depth. Less well
supported actors may take advantage of commercial or
academic models in an attempt to gain high military
impact for low cost and effort. Determining how to
thwart, for example, a terrorist organization turning
a facial recognition model into a targeting system for
exploding drones is certainly a prudent move.
Technologies such as evolutionary development of
model structures in a reinforcement learning environment
can create a framework to support the development of
unique network structures that cannot be predicted by an
adversary [30]. Further, such a framework can be induced
to create different networks that address the same sets
of problems, making it possible to generate a diverse set
of systems providing redundancy and resilience.
B. Incorporating Legal and Ethical Constraints
Modern AI/ML systems reflect the data used to train
them. In commercial and academic systems, data often
reflects unconscious biases that emerge in the trained
behavior of the system [31]. This type of behavior only
becomes more dangerous when it is connected with
weapon systems. We need to develop techniques that
allow us to train models that have the appropriate
doctrine “baked in” so that they can operate appropriately
in contexts ranging from war games in peacetime to
escorting an adversarial emissary to a peace conference
in wartime. Although some research exists for encoding
legal and ethical considerations (e.g., using evolutionary
approaches [32]), publications in this area are rare.
C. Mapping, Traceability, and Transparency
It is our strong belief that intelligent weapons systems
of the future will move and think at machine speed. This
disproportionate capability and the inevitable system
trust human operators will place in these machines means
that most if not all lethal and sub-lethal interactions will
only be analyzable in hindsight [33]. Military weapon
system models must be built to support a recorded
mapping of inputs that can be traced to actions or
recommendations. This level of transparency is crucial
for post-incident analysis, validation, and retraining.
D. Lack of diversity
Because the creation of models is complicated and time
consuming, few commercial models address substantively
similar tasks at the same level of sophistication. Indeed,
there is often only one “best” model for any set of data.
In either a cybersecurity or military context, this sort
of monoculture represents a predictable single point of
failure. Diverse models need to be developed to address
tasks redundantly, and they must be regularly revisited,
modified, or rebuilt to ensure any adversary obtaining
a system using one model will not be able to rely
completely on it in the face of battle. This challenge will
likely not be met in the academic or commercial commu-
nity, where raw performance improvements determines
success, not survivability and ruggedness.
V. THE ROLE OF HUMANS
Because of the rate of technological development in
the AI/ML space, we believe that the role of humans
in combat systems, barring regulation through treaty,1 will
become more peripheral over time. As such, it is critical to
ensure that our design decisions and the implementations
of these designs incorporate the values that we wish to
express as a national and global culture.
A. Human-in-the-loop
The starting point for many intelligent systems begins
with the tight integration of human and machine in
the weapon system. For example, missiles announce
when they have a lock, increasing the capability of the
warfighter and leave little ambiguity as to what the
weapons system will do once the trigger is pulled. If
fault has to be found, it will be the human that must
bear the responsibility.
But in more ambiguous circumstance, such as friend-
or-foe identification (IFF), the data used to make the
calculation will be in the possession of the system, not the
user. Imagine a case where an IFF transponders have been
known to be spoofed by the adversary, and a large, slow
moving aircraft identifying as civilian has been detected
on what seems to be a hostile approach, and only a short
time to make a decision. There are four presentations:
(1) the system can declare that it has identified the aircraft
as hostile and provide a lock; (2) the system can declare
the aircraft as friendly and open a channel to warn; (3) the
system can present a set of ranked recommendations and
provide a set of options to the user; or (4) the system
simply displays the raw information.
The third option may seem to be the best embodiment
of the human-in-the-loop philosophy, but it discounts the
effects of system trust. The user may spend some time
evaluating the list of options the first few times, but if
the system places the correct option at the top of the
list often enough, the human user will begin to simply
select that option. This effect is exacerbated with time
pressures. The human simply becomes a rubber stamp.
If, however, the system is trained by a set of known
individuals, and the provenance of the system ranking
can be traced back to its “mentor.” Mentors could train
the model in the context of the current deployment and be
known to the user. The machine then incorporates rules of
engagement that are related to the particular deployment
through this human interaction. Further, weights that are
accumulated from these interactions can be brought back
and integrated into the models, allowing them to evolve
with respect to the current realities of a given battlespace.
1 And assuming that AI/ML systems are not advanced enough to
autonomously incorporate the risk and consequences of violating
international treaty into their decision-making.
B. Human-on-the-loop
As human-in-the-loop systems advance, the system
with less need to rely on human decision-making to
achieve results will begin to dominate. Thus, humans
will be relegated to offline analysis and improvement of
AI strategies during training. Work is already being done
in this space commercially. Examples of what is essentially
human-on-the-loop architectures are regularly explored
now in StarCraft competitions [19]. From a machine
learning perspective, the difference between a StarCraft
2 environment an autonomous Aegis battlegroup is one
of scale and consequences. Though, human-on-the-loop
systems have less interaction in real-time, integration of
the mentor architecture described above may be possible.
This integration would depend on the creation of offline
wargames and simulations that can be played at rates
slow enough to elicit meaningful training from expert
human cognition.
Continually running human-led scenarios offline in-
creases the odds that the trained system reflects the
realities of the battlespace [8]. Separate classifier systems
may also be able to catalog adversary behaviors near
the boundaries of the current trained responses. These
boundaries might be detected by looking at the behavior
of the systems themselves and recognizing when they are
making decisions among multiple options with divergent
potential outcomes.
C. Human initiated
An extension of the human-on-the-loop approach
is the human-initiated “fire and forget” approach to
battlefield AI. Once the velocity and dimensionality of
the battlespace increase beyond human comprehension,
human involvement will be limited to choosing the
temporal and physical bounds of behavior desired in
an anticipated context. Depending on the immediacy
or unpredictability of the threat, engaging the system
manually at the onset of hostilities may be impossible.
Rather, these systems would need to be activated before
the onset of hostilities. Activation alone could be an
extremely consequential. Once activated, shutting the
system down for any reason may be interpreted by an
adversarial AI as a weakness to be exploited. Predicting
with confidence how a conflict between two equally
matched, highly capable AI systems would unfold once
started may be impossible. These conflicts would have
to be simulated extensively against a wide variety of
adversaries to have any confidence that their behavior
would align with our national values.
D. Post-hoc forensics
Given a battlespace so overwhelming that humans
cannot manually engage with the system, the human
role will be limited to post-hoc forensic analysis, once
hostilities have ceased, or treaties have been signed and
implemented.2 To this end, these systems will need the
maximal amount of provenance of input data, alternatives
considered, and actions selected with sufficiently high-
fidelity recordings that any error or inexplicable behavior
can be meaningfully interpreted [34]. Recent work that
applies an approach of this sort is the concept of an
“activation atlas” [33] that can show areas of conceptual
conflict within a model. These approaches are nascent,
but need to be vigorously explored and developed.
VI. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Tight integration of AI into the kill chain is not a
decision to be taken lightly. Particularly with respect to
LAWS, our policy should be: not until they can outperform
human/MI collaboration, including making ethically acceptable
choices [3]. Prior to this, deepening our understanding
of the roles, risks, and rewards of integrating AI into
the killchain can better define the problem space of the
solutions that we contemplate.
Many of the solutions needed to address concerns
identified herein are likely also useful in commercial or
civilian settings. The dual use applications for responsive,
diverse and adaptable AI seem numerous, ranging from
near-term problems such as autonomous vehicles in
varied environments, to locally personalized, private, and
secure AI assistants. Novel solutions in these area could
be useful in many sectors of today’s economy, and might
kickstart new developments in AI that would in turn
inform and improve the development of systems focused
on military problems. Also, violence is not limited to
nation-state level conflict. Some of the challenges outlined
herein may ultimately arise in civilian contexts.
For industry, the incentives for developing adaptable
AI are currently low, but here is an opportunity for
the defense community to once more contribute to
technological advances in ways that benefit the broader
population, much in the same way that the development
of the B-52 “spilled over” into the development of the
Boeing 707 and subsequent commercial jet aircraft [35].
Ethically-aware AI support systems would be useful
across many human domains, including law, diplomacy,
and negotiations between multiple parties. As war has
been often described as the application of force as a
replacement for diplomacy, perhaps AI-enhanced diplo-
macy can reduce the risk of a hyper-accelerated AI war.
Finally, this paper assumes that AI does not ultimately
“run away” from human ability to control it. Serious
philosophers view this sort of “technological singularity”
as a realistic scenario, and we believe it must be addressed
no later than widespread use of human-on-the-loop
systems.
This paper presents a framework for understanding
the integration of AI and ML into military weapons
2 Diplomacy in such an environment seems like a nearly incompre-
hensible challenge and deserves extensive research on its own.
systems. The steps we take may be on a path to human
obsolescence as combatants, and the decision to proceed
on this path should be well informed and involve all
members of our societies. Given that other players are
deeply engaged in the weaponization of AI, we would
be foolish not to research and experiment with the
development of highly capable systems. But we believe
that a better answer may be to to support regulation
and prohibition because, like chemical and biological
weapons, for weaponized AI, “the only winning move is
not to play.”
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